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+#!/usr/bin/env python
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+# Copyright 2016 Cloudera Inc.
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+#
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+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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+# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
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+#
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+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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+#
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+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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+# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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+# limitations under the License.
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+
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+# This file comes from the Apache2 licenced file source code file https://github.com/apache/incubator-impala/blob/45ff0f9e674f54b35afb2b5eced0d6ec346890d6/shell/TSSLSocketWithWildcardSAN.py
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+
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+import re
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+
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+from thrift.transport import TSSLSocket
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+from thrift.transport.TTransport import TTransportException
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+
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+class CertificateError(ValueError):
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+ """Convenience class to raise errors"""
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+ pass
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+
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+class TSSLSocketWithWildcardSAN(TSSLSocket.TSSLSocket):
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+ """
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+ This is a subclass of thrift's TSSLSocket which has been extended to add the missing
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+ functionality of validating wildcard certificates and certificates with SANs
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+ (subjectAlternativeName).
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+
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+ The core of the validation logic is based on the python-ssl library:
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+ See <https://svn.python.org/projects/python/tags/r32/Lib/ssl.py>
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+ """
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+ def __init__(self,
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+ host='localhost',
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+ port=9090,
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+ validate=True,
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+ ca_certs=None,
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+ unix_socket=None,
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+ keyfile=None, certfile=None
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+ ):
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+ TSSLSocket.TSSLSocket.__init__(self, host, port, validate, ca_certs, keyfile, certfile, unix_socket)
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+
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+ def _validate_cert(self):
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+ cert = self.handle.getpeercert()
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+ self.peercert = cert
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+ if 'subject' not in cert:
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+ raise TTransportException(
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+ type=TTransportException.NOT_OPEN,
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+ message='No SSL certificate found from %s:%s' % (self.host, self.port))
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+ try:
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+ self._match_hostname(cert, self.host)
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+ self.is_valid = True
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+ return
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+ except CertificateError, ce:
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+ raise TTransportException(
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+ type=TTransportException.UNKNOWN,
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+ message='Certificate error with remote host: %s' % (ce))
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+ raise TTransportException(
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+ type=TTransportException.UNKNOWN,
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+ message='Could not validate SSL certificate from '
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+ 'host "%s". Cert=%s' % (self.host, cert))
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+
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+ def _match_hostname(self, cert, hostname):
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+ """Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
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+ SSLSocket.getpeercert()) matches the *hostname*. RFC 2818 and RFC 6125
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+ rules are followed, but IP addresses are not accepted for *hostname*.
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+
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+ CertificateError is raised on failure. On success, the function
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+ returns nothing.
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+ """
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+ dnsnames = []
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+ san = cert.get('subjectAltName', ())
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+ for key, value in san:
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+ if key == 'DNS':
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+ if self._dnsname_match(value, hostname):
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+ return
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+ dnsnames.append(value)
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+ if not dnsnames:
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+ # The subject is only checked when there is no dNSName entry
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+ # in subjectAltName
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+ for sub in cert.get('subject', ()):
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+ for key, value in sub:
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+ # XXX according to RFC 2818, the most specific Common Name
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+ # must be used.
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+ if key == 'commonName':
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+ if self._dnsname_match(value, hostname):
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+ return
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+ dnsnames.append(value)
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+ if len(dnsnames) > 1:
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+ raise CertificateError("hostname %r "
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+ "doesn't match either of %s"
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+ % (hostname, ', '.join(map(repr, dnsnames))))
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+ elif len(dnsnames) == 1:
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+ raise CertificateError("hostname %r "
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+ "doesn't match %r"
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+ % (hostname, dnsnames[0]))
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+ else:
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+ raise CertificateError("no appropriate commonName or "
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+ "subjectAltName fields were found")
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+
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+ def _dnsname_match(self, dn, hostname, max_wildcards=1):
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+ """Matching according to RFC 6125, section 6.4.3
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+ http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
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+ """
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+ pats = []
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+ if not dn:
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+ return False
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+
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+ # Ported from python3-syntax:
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+ # leftmost, *remainder = dn.split(r'.')
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+ parts = dn.split(r'.')
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+ leftmost = parts[0]
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+ remainder = parts[1:]
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+
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+ wildcards = leftmost.count('*')
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+ if wildcards > max_wildcards:
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+ # Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more
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+ # than one wildcard per fragment. A survey of established
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+ # policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a
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+ # reasonable choice.
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+ raise CertificateError(
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+ "too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn))
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+
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+ # speed up common case w/o wildcards
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+ if not wildcards:
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+ return dn.lower() == hostname.lower()
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+
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+ # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
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+ # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in which
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+ # the wildcard character comprises a label other than the left-most label.
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+ if leftmost == '*':
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+ # When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless
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+ # fragment.
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+ pats.append('[^.]+')
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+ elif leftmost.startswith('xn--') or hostname.startswith('xn--'):
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+ # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
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+ # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
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+ # where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
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+ # U-label of an internationalized domain name.
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+ pats.append(re.escape(leftmost))
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+ else:
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+ # Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless string, e.g. www*
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+ pats.append(re.escape(leftmost).replace(r'\*', '[^.]*'))
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+
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+ # add the remaining fragments, ignore any wildcards
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+ for frag in remainder:
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+ pats.append(re.escape(frag))
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+
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+ pat = re.compile(r'\A' + r'\.'.join(pats) + r'\Z', re.IGNORECASE)
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+ return pat.match(hostname)
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